William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 28 (2003-2004)
Issue 3

Article 6

April 2004

Perfect Harmony: The Federal Courts have Quarantined Harmon
and Preserved EPA's Power to Overfile
Thomas A. Benson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Repository Citation
Thomas A. Benson, Perfect Harmony: The Federal Courts have Quarantined Harmon and
Preserved EPA's Power to Overfile, 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 885 (2004),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol28/iss3/6
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr

PERFECT HAMoN. THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE

QUARANTINED HARMONAND PRESERVED EPA'S POWER TO
OVERFILE
THOMAS A. BENSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION: RESTORING HARMONY

In September 1999, the Eighth Circuit upset an understanding about the
nature of environmental federalism that had endured for three decades.
Proclaiming that the permissibility of overfiling' was a question of first
impression,' the court in Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner decided that
statutory language in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") prohibited overfiling.3 The decision ignited a firestorm of
questions about how broadly it applied to Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") enforcement under RCRA, and whether it also barred overfiling
under the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and Clean Water Act ("CWA"), leaving
both environmentalists and regulated parties anxious to see how the decision
would reverberate through the federal courts In some instances,
*The author is a 2004 J.D.candidate at Harvard Law School. He earned a B.A. from Brown
University in 1998. He would like to thank the staff of the William andMary Environmental
Law and Policy Review; professor Steven Ferrey, for his helpful comments on an earlier
version of this Article; and his wife Megan for her love, support, and proofreading.
'This is defined as Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") enforcement actions filed
after the initiation of state action. See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 898
(8th Cir. 1999).
2 Id. The trial court asserted that Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
overfiling was a question of first impression, and the circuit court apparently adopted the
assertion for circuit courts while losing the RCRA qualifier. See Harmon Indus., Inc. v.
Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988, 995 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191
F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1999). If one combines their qualifiers, the two courts were
technically correct, but solelybecause the Eighth Circuit defined overfiling narrowly to apply
only to cases of federal enforcement following the initiation of a state action. See Harmon,
191 F.3d at 898. The two courts largely ignored a significant run of precedent that touched
on overfiling. See infra notes 9-31.
' Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902 ("Therefore, we find that the EPA's practice of overfiling, in
those states where it has authorized the states to act, oversteps the federal agency's authority
under the RCRA.").
' See, e.g., Susan K. Wiens & William P. Hefier, Disharmony in EPA 's Overfiling Policy,
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imaginations ran wild. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the decision, a
thirteen-year veteran of EPA's general counsel's office predicted that
Harmon would apply with equal force to CAA, CWA, and Safe Drinking
Water Act.'
Five years later, Harmon does indeed seem to have clarified the
subject-but not in the way industry groups might have hoped. The federal
courts that have considered overfiling after Harmon have uniformly
distinguished, criticized, or flatly rejected its reasoning. The pattern that has
emerged is not that of a hopeless morass ofcontradictoryrulings, but ofa single
outlier renounced or distinguished by the weight ofthe federal judiciary. Rather
than sparking an outbreak of similar cases, as observers had either hoped or
feared depending on their political orientation, Harmon has essentially been
quarantined by the run of cases that followed it. Without a dramatic revival,
its value as precedent is likely to continue to atrophy until it is regarded as a
mere curiosity rather than a breakthrough.6
This Article begins by examining the revolutionary nature of the
Harmon decision in the context of the legal understanding of overfiling at the
time. In Part III, it recounts the federal cases limiting the peripheral impact
of Harmon.Part IV examines the most recent point of the quarantine: the first

15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 7 (2000) (calling Harmon "a landmark step toward resolving the decades old question of EPA's ability to overfile" and predicting a "significant
impact" on overfiling rights under CAA and CWA).
5
See Gerald H. Yamada, FederalAppealsCourt UndercutsEPA's "Overfiling"Authority,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 3, 1999. Yamada's comment makes clear he was not a fan of
overfiling; he calls Harmon a "poignant decision" in his first sentence. See id.
6
The one thing that might rescue Harmon now is support from the Supreme Court, but the
Court announced on May 5, 2003 that it wouldnot grant certiorari for UnitedStates v. Power
Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002), the most dramatic challenge to Harmonthus far,
leaving the quarantine intact. Power Engineering Co. v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1929
(2003). The Tenth Circuit opinion left standing by the Court's denial of certiorari removed
any lingering doubt that there is a circuit split on overfiLing. See Joel A. Mintz, Comment,
Enforcement "Overfiling" in the Federal Courts: Some Thoughts on the Post-Harmon
Cases, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 425, 450-52 (2003) (noting that "it seems clear that such a
conflict does exist," but that whether the Supreme Court will step in "is difficult to predict").
But see Elizabeth A. Clysdale, A Look at EPA Overfiling: Can Harmon and Power
Engineering Exist in Harmony?, [2003] 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,456, 10,465
(June 2003) (arguing that the narrow holdings of Harmon and Power Engineering can be
reconciled to allow EPA enforcement when the "state fails to take adequate enforcement or
bring any action at all"). This reconciliation seems to stretch both Harmon and Power
Engineeringbeyond the breaking point. See infra Parts II.D., IV.C.
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undeniable, direct challenge from a sister circuit.
II.

HARMON SHOCKS THE SYSTEM

The trial and appellate court Harmondecisions had a particularly dramatic impact because they upset an uneasy cease-fire on overfiling. Since EPA
was created in 1970, beginning the era of federal environmental regulation,
state and federal officials had been engaging in turf battles, particularly over
environmental enforcement.7 Mindful ofthis tension, EPA used its overfiling
power "very sparingly," but the legal authority to do so was not seriously
challenged in federal court until the Harmon trial court decision.' In fact,
EPA's overfiling authority seemed to be stronger than ever when the Eighth
Circuit ruled.
A.

Overfiling's History Before Harmon

The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to address overfiling in
light of the new environmental statutes passed in the 1970s. 9 In resolving a
challenge to EPA's approval of CAA State Implementation Plans ("SIPs"),
the court went on to muse in somewhat contradictory dicta about dual
enforcement. The court noted that a state had the power to enforce its SIP, but
that such authority did not "detract from [EPA's] primary ability to enforce
federally the provisions of every state plan against citizens of that state which
drew the plan."'" In a footnote to that statement, however, the court added in
hypothetical terms that it believed dual penalties would not be appropriate
and that jurisdiction should be vested in the court, whether state or federal,
that received the first claim."
Subsequent circuit opinions offered something for everyone, though they
rarely addressed overfiling directly. In 1980, the Ninth Circuit reached a
7 See

Mintz, supra note 6, at 425.

'See id. at 427-28. The issue arose in a handful of federal cases and in EPA administrative
proceedings. For a detailed history, see generally Jerry Organ, EnvironmentalFederalism
PartI: The History of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Priorto Harmon,
Smithfield, and CLEAN, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,615 (Aug. 2000).
9See Buckeye Power, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Organ,
supra note 8, at 10,617-18 (calling Buckeye Power the "first and only federal appellate court
to speak to the issues of overfiling and res judicata in the 1970s").
'0 Buckeye Power,481 F.2d at 167.
" See id. at 167 n.2.
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bizarre split decision in UnitedStates v. ITTRayonier: it found overfiling was
allowed under CWA but barred by res judicata. The defendant in the case
operated a pulp mill in Washington and obtained a discharge permit from the
state, which had received delegated CWA authority. 2 After a multi-sided
dispute over the terms of the permit, EPA brought an enforcement action
against the mill. 13 Meanwhile, the state's highest court upheld the defendant's
reading of the permit while the defendant's federal appeal was pending before
the Ninth Circuit.' 4 The Ninth Circuit found that the decision by the state
court had res judicata effect on EPA's claim.' 5 While the court found the
CWA legislative history to be "replete with references to 'dual' or 'concurrent' enforcement authority,"' 6 it found that the statute did nothing to
abrogate res judicata and went on to find privity between EPA and the state
agency in question. 7
Six years later, the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA's RCRA authority to
compel information related to a substantial hazard to human health or the
environment. 8 The court found that the "in lieu of the federal program"
language in 42 U.S.C. § 6926, which was to play a major role in the Harmon
decisions, did not indicate Congressional intent to revoke EPA's § 6934
power in delegated states and that EPA's interpretation of its authority was
reasonable and thus merited Chevron deference. 9
The most dramatic circuit statement on overfiling before Harmon came
just one month after ITTRayonier, when the Seventh Circuit went out of its
way to declare, in dicta, that EPA had no RCRA overfiling authority. 2 The
case arose when a landfill operator wanted to contest statements the EPA

12United States
13Id. at 999.

v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1980).

Id. at 999-1000.

'4

at 1003-04.
Id. at 1001 (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 1000-03.
'5Id.
16

" See Wyckoff Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 796 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing
EPA's power to issue orders under 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (2000)).
19Id.
20 See Northside

Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1986).
The landfill operator was afraid the regional administrator's statements, which he said were
false, would leave him with more responsibility for cleanup and closure than he deserved.
The landfill operator also made other arguments that did not affect the overfiling discussion.
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regional administrator made during a permitting process. 2' The posture was
thus the opposite of most other overfiling cases: the defendant was arguing
in favor of EPA authority so he could challenge the statements. Though the
case had nothing to do with enforcement, the Seventh Circuit opined that:
Even if the EPA is dissatisfied with, for example, the enforcement action taken by a state against a specific hazardous
waste disposal facility, or the settlement agreement reached
between the state and the facility, so long as the state has
exercised its judgment in a reasonable manner and within its
statutory authority, the EPA is without authority to commence
an independent enforcement action or to modify the
agreement.22
This language seems to have had little effect, however. In the succeeding
two years, two federal trial courts in Indiana, a delegated RCRA state,
distinguished Northside as being a standing case and upheld EPA enforcement actions where the state had failed to pursue enforcement. 3 Then, in
1991, the First Circuit found that RCRA did nothing to prevent the federal
government from bringing criminal RCRA claims where the state had apparently not pursued enforcement. 24 The court also read the RCRA legislative
history as manifesting a "desire to retain a strong federal presence."25
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, again in a case without state enforcement action,
found RCRA left EPA with "the power to enforce the substance of an approved state's program against private parties in that state."26 The consensus
seemed to be reached that EPA could conduct enforcement in delegated
states, though whether it could do so following state action was unclear.
While the federal appellate courts were tangentially addressing over21 Id.
22 See

id. at 382 (citation omitted).

See United States v. Envtl. Waste Control, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1422, 1437-38 (N.D. Ind.
1988); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co. of ll., 660 F. Supp. 1236, 1243-45 (N.D.

Ind. 1987).
24 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35,44 (1 st Cir. 1991).
MacDonaldis also notable for the attorneys who prepared the case before the First Circuit.
The EPA group included Richard B. Stewart, then an assistant attorney general and now a
renowned professor at New York University Law School, and Lincoln C. Almond, a United
States
Attorney who later became governor of Rhode Island. Id. at 38.
25
Id. at 45.
26 United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1367 (5th Cir. 1996).
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filing and a handful of district courts were allowing EPA enforcement,27 there
was also a long-running battle within EPA and its adjudicatory system over
whether the practice was allowed. In the first half of the 1980s, two
Administrative Law Judges ("ALUs") found EPA enforcement barred in
RCRA cases if the state had already brought an enforcement action.2" In one
case, the matter was appealed all the way to the Administrator, who vacated
the AI's overfiling ruling after the Agency decided to drop the action.29 The
second case was vacated after a deputy administrator solicited an opinion
from the agency's general counsel, who found that RCRA did not bar overfiling.3" That opinion quieted EPA's internal overfiling battle."a
Overfiling was thus not quite the virgin territory that the Eighth Circuit
suggested, though there was certainly no definitive answer on the issue when
Harmonwas decided, nor were there many cases addressing dual consecutive
enforcement as the Harmon facts required. Ironically, however, the Harmon
cases came at a time when overfiling seemed to be reaching equilibrium after
the turbulence of the 1980s; until the Harmon trial court case, the sporadic
cases that arose in the 1990s treated overfiling as uncontroversial and it may
have appeared that the issue was settled.32

In addition to the Indiana cases, a pair of federal courts in Maryland also upheld EPA
overfiling, this time in CAA cases where there had been state action. See United States v.
SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Md. 1985) (state enforcement "does not affect
defendant's liability under federal law or preclude this Court from hearing the case on the
merits" (citation omitted)); United States v. Harford Sands, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733,735 (D.
Md. 1983) (stating that "a violation of the federal provisions just cited is unaffected by the
defendant's cooperation with the state").
28 Organ, supra note 8, at 10,621-26.
29 See id. at 10,622-23.
30
See id. at 10,624-26.
31 See id. 10,626-28 (noting that all but one of the RCRA overfiling cases after the general
counsel's opinion followed his direction and that the one outlier was overturned on internal
appeal).
3 One example of the overfiling equilibrium is that when Power Engineering Company
challenged the preliminary injunction against it, the company did not question EPA's
authority to bring a suit after its settlement with the state. See United States v. Power Eng'g
Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1999); cf Mintz, supra note 6, at 428 ("Nonetheless,
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the EPA's legal power to overfile in cases of
inadequate state enforcement proceedings was never seriously questioned.").
27
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EPA Gets Ambushed

EPA may have helped generate the challenge that flowered in Harmon.
In 1997, the Agency increased its overfiling "as a way to ensure that states
improve their economic recoveries." 3 While the EPA enforcement action at
issue in Harmon was instituted well before that shift in policy, 34 the trial court
and the Eighth Circuit may have been aware of the new policy by the time the
case arrived. In fact, some evidence suggests EPA was ambushed at the
Eighth Circuit: one contemporary article noted that twenty-six parties filed
amicus briefs on behalf of the Harmon defendant, while not one filed on
behalf of EPA.3
The amicus disparity suggests that regulated parties were looking for an
opportunity to challenge overfiling, while EPA may have come to believe it
was invincible on the issue. The facts of the case reinforce that impression.
The story told by the trial and appellate courts is one of EPA picking on a
responsible company. The appellate court begins by introducing Harmon as a
'
company that makes parts for "railroad control and safety equipment,"36
thereby implicitly casting EPA as opposing railroad safety. In 1987,
Harmon's personnel manager discovered that workers had been discarding
volatile solvent residue behind the plant, apparently for fourteen years.37 The
manager reported the practice to his superiors and Harmon then stopped the
disposal and contacted state authorities." The state found no threat to "human
health or the environment" and reached an agreement with Harmon for the
company to clean up the area. 39 The court portrays EPA as an interloper,
initiating a $2.3 million enforcement action "[w]hile Harmon was cooperating with" the state.' The court seems to have massaged the facts slightly, but
may well have concluded that EPA was overreaching in this "unique" case.4
33 See Christiana

Coop, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 253,257-58
(2001) (citation omitted).
3 See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988,989 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (EPA filed
its first complaint in 1991).
"' Wiens & Hefner, supra note 4, at 3. Interestingly, five states filed an amicus brief
supporting EPA's request for rehearing en banc, though the request was denied. Id. at 5.
36 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 1999).
37 Id. at 896-97.
38

1 d. at 897.

39

40

Id.

Id.
"' See Wiens & Heftier, supra note 4, at 7 (calling Harmon a "unique" case because the
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When Harmon reached the district court, and later at the Eighth Circuit,
the judges were faced with a sympathetic fact pattern and may also have been
aware that EPA was beginning to flex its overfiling power. At the same time,
the courts were apparently unaware, or purported to be unaware, of
overfiling's generally accepted status.42 Several factors irrelevant to the pure
legal status of overfiling were thus guiding the courts toward granting relief
to Harmon.
C.

The Opening Salvo Against Overfiling

The Harmon trial court decision represented the first federal court
decision against overfiling on the merits, and it announced many of the
themes that would be taken up by the Eighth Circuit, and later challenged by
the quarantining courts.
After outlining the law and the arguments from each side at some length,
the Harmon district court judge pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), finding that
the "plain language" of the provision provides that the state program is to operate "in lieu of' the federal one.43 The court found that the state and federal
governments were in a cooperative relationship to enforce the hazardous
waste program, but that such cooperation did not extend to dual enforcement,
which "would predictably result in confusion, inefficiency, duplicative
agency expenditures.. . ." The trial judge then pointed, rather unhelpfully,

to the "same force and effect" language of § 6926(d) as meaning "exactly

company reported voluntarily and cooperated in the cleanup). That EPA may have
overreached is also suggested by the fact that the ALJ reduced the proposed fine by seventyfive percent during the administrative proceeding. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897. Harmon
Industries, however, should not be seen as totally innocent. In the expanded facts provided
by the trial court, it emerges that the company was dumping thirty gallons of solvents a
month, though Harmon Industries claimed most of the material evaporated. See Harmon
Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988, 990 (W.D. Mo. 1998). That monthly dumping
would total about five thousand gallons over the fourteen-year period before the personnel
manager first discovered the problem. A reasonable observer might suspect that such
dumping
could not occur for fourteen years without any company managers knowing of it.
42
See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text.
43 See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000), "[s]uch State is
authorized to carry out such program in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter in
such State and to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of
hazardous waste").
"Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
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what it says."4' The judge went on to note that state action had the same
binding effect as EPA action, essentially restating § 6926(d) without explaining what connection it had to overfiling. The court then called dual
enforcement "a schizophrenic approach" that would "result in uncertainty"
over to whom to go for negotiations and settlements. 6 The court concluded
by finding EPA's interpretation of the statute contrary to the purpose of
authorizing state programs.47
The judge then offered an alternative holding based on resjudicata. The
court found that, under Missouri res judicata law, all four requirements were
satisfied, including privity between the state and EPA.4' The court decided
that even if the interests of EPA and the state agency were not identical, they
were asserting the same legal rights, which it determined was sufficient under
Missouri law.49
While not necessarily obvious in the opinion, the judge seemed to
possess a latent skepticism about EPA and its motives that emerged in a pair
of footnotes. In dismissing EPA's suggestion that the state settlement was
unduly lenient, the judge wrote that if EPA believed Missouri was too
friendly to industry it should withdraw authority from the state program."0
The footnote shows the judge was either unaware of or unconcerned with the
impossibility of EPA withdrawing authorization from every state with a
propensity toward cutting deals with industry. More telling, the court found
"it interesting" that EPA accepted the state's investigation, cleanup, and
enforcement and only sought a penalty in its enforcement action." The judge
seemed offended by what he perceived to be EPA's uncouth obsession with
the penalty, adding that he found "it somewhat disconcerting that the only
argument regarding [the state's] effectiveness concerns money."52 While the
judge gave no indication that his qualms with EPA affected his decision, it
seems fair to surmise that he may have been looking, perhaps subconsciously,
to find a legal justification to bar the EPA action.
45

1 d. at

996 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d), "[a]ny action taken by a State under a hazardous
waste program authorized under this section shall have the same force and effect as action
taken by the Administrator under this subchapter").
4' Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
47
1 d. at 996-97.
48
1Id. at 997-98.
49
Id.at 998.
°Id. at 998 n. 12.
1

I at 996 n.8.
1d.
s See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 996 n.8.
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The Eighth CircuitDisrupts the Equilibrium

Like the trial court, the Eighth Circuit seemed to have a preferred result
for the case-a notion buttressed by the effort the court was willing to expend
to reach its decision. As the Tenth Circuit later decided in Power
Engineering,the simplest way to address overfiling was to find the statute
ambiguous and thus let EPA's interpretation control under Chevron. 3 To
prevent EPA enforcement, the Eighth Circuit had to find RCRA in Harmon
ambiguously prevented the possibility of overfiling.
The first sentence of the discussion section of the opinion suggested the
case's resolution. The court interpreted Chevron as requiring judicial
deference "only if it finds that the agency's interpretation is consistent with
the plain language of the statute or represents a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute."54 While technically a correct statement of the law, the
phrasing seems to shift the default away from judicial deference and toward
de novo interpretation."
In finding that the plain language of RCRA unambiguously bars overfiling, the court marshaled four primary arguments. First, looking to 42
U.S.C. §6926(b)-outlining authorized state regulatory programs-the court
found that the statute allows state programs to operate "in lieu of" the federal
program.5 6 Unlike the trial court, the Eighth Circuit conceded that the "in lieu
of' language referred only to the permit program itself and not to enforcement, but went on to decide that "administration and enforcement ...are
inexorably intertwined," and that the language reveals Congressional intent
for authorized states to "supplant" the federal program "in all respects
including enforcement." 57 In the court's view, the only authority left to EPA
was in situations in which state authorization was rescinded or the state failed
to pursue enforcement. 58

United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1236-40 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1999).
"By contrast, the Chevron standard seems to create a default of agency deference unless the
meaning of the statute is clear. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (if "Congress has not
directly addressedthe precisequestion at issue... the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute" (emphasis added)).
' See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899.
"

57 Id.
58 Id.
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The court's second point of argument was the "same force and effect"
language in § 6926(d). 9 The court found the inclusion of the phrase "[a]ny
action taken by a State" also indicated Congressional intent to allow states to
supplant federal enforcement.' Next, the court pointed to the citizen suit
provision, § 6972(b)(1)(B), and found that its language supported a bar on
overfiling as well. 61 The statute prevents citizen suits if EPA or a state is
diligently pursuing civil enforcement.6 2 The court found that the use of"or"
rather than "and/or" indicated that Congress did not envision "competing
enforcement actions between the federal government and the states."63 For the
fourth pillar of its holding, the court looked to RCRA's legislative history and
found that Congress "intended to vest primary enforcement authority in the
states."' Concluding its analysis, the court held that EPA's interpretation
simply is not consistent with the plain language of the statute,
its legislative history, or its declared purpose. Hence, it is also
an unreasonable interpretation to which we accord no
deference. Therefore, we fimd that the EPA's practice of
overfiling, in those states where it has authorized the state to
act, oversteps the federal agency's authority under the
RCRA.65
The court also affirmed the trial court's alternative holding that res
judicata barred the EPA action." Applying Missouri law, it found the four
state requirements were met.67 The court offered substantive analysis for only

59

Id.

60 Id. at 900 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (2000)).
61 See

6

id. at 900-01.
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B)(2000) (prohibiting citizen suits "if the Administrator

or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of

the United States or a State to require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order").
" Harmon, 191 F.3d at 901.
64Id.
65
/d. at 902.
66 See id. at 902-03.

Id. at 902. The court listed the requirements as: "(1) [i]dentity of the thing sued for; (2)
identity of the cause of action; (3) identify of the persons and parties to the action; and (4)
identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made." Id. (citing
Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo. 1966) (en banc)).
67
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the identity of the parties requirement, and found that the same language that
barred overfiling indicated that EPA and the state stood "in the same relationship to one another.""8
In eleven pages of the FederalReporter,the Eighth Circuit completely
upended the established understanding of EPA's overfiling power. Of course,
the court gave no sign that it recognized what that understanding was. Of the
previous federal court overfiling opinions, Harmon cited only the trial court
decision and Wyckoff, and the latter only in a terse footnote distinguishing it
as not applying to cases with dual enforcement actions.69
Despite the Eighth Circuit's tenuous reasoning and dubious reading of
precedent, the case was a clarion call for those hoping to curtail federal
environmental enforcement and return control to the states.7° Such a shift
would mean a dramatic decrease in the environmental protections afforded
in pro-business states.7 EPA decided not to appeal to the Supreme Court and
to hope instead for relief from the nation's lower federal courts.72 The Agency
would not have long to wait.
Ill. FEDERAL COURTS REACT BY QUARANTINING HARMON
One author noted that Harmon "gave rise to swift and pointed criticism
from legal commentators."7 3 The reaction from federal courts was nearly as

6

sHarmon, 191 F.3d at 903.
69 See id. at 902 n.4 (citing Wyckoff Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 796 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1986)). The Eighth Circuit onlybroached Wyckoffbecause EPA cited itas showing that EPA
retained enforcement authority in delegated states. See id.
70 See Yanada, supra note 5 (finding the ruling "should force EPA to re-think its
relationships with states authorized to implement and enforcement environmental programs,
and act as a harbinger to EPA's enforcement program if the agency continues its paternalistic
oversight of authorized states' individual enforcement actions."). Another commentator
suggested, in 2000, that at the least "Harmon may serve as a 'wake-up' call to EPA... to
be more circumspect in exercising its overfiling authority... ." Jerry Organ, Environmental
FederalismPartII: The Impact of Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN on Overfiling Under
RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,732, 10,755
(Sept. 2000).
' See Mintz, supra note 6, at 426 (stating that without overfiling, EPA would be forced to
accept "'pollution havens' in states with lax environmental enforcement policies" or
withdraw state authorization, creating "an enormous strain" on the agency's resources).
72
See Coop, supra note 33, at 269.
3Mintz, supra note 6, at 431.

2004]

PERFECT HARMONY

897

swift once the Harmon challenges began to arrive. The Harmon decision was
filed on September 16, 1999. 71 Ironically, given the Eighth Circuit's
impression that it was giving the first word on the subject, sister circuits
decided two cases at least tangentially related to overfiling in the eight days
before September 16. In the first case, filed on September 8, the Tenth Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction for EPA while assuming that RCRA
overfiling was allowed." On September 14, the Fourth Circuit rejected an
overfiling challenge to a CWA enforcement action, finding that the state
enforcement scheme was not sufficiently comparable to EPA's enforcement
authority.76 Thus, the Harmon court was not writing on the clean slate it had
anticipated.
Over the next four years, every federal court that considered Harmon's
overfiling holding distinguished it in some manner, often while expressing
skepticism about the decision. 77 In doing so, the courts have created a jurisprudence where the weight of authority has isolated Harmon, making it an
outlier rather than a precursor. This Part examines the quarantining cases by
looking at their challenge to Harmon: either distinguishing based on differences in the statutory language at issue or on the quality of state enforcement
action. These cases culminate with the unmistakable frontal assault in the
Tenth Circuit's Power Engineeringopinion, discussed in Part TV.
A.

DistinguishingBased on Statutory Language

Five cases distinguished Harmon by pointing to statutory language
differences between RCRA and either CWA or CAA. Ironically, the first
opinion handed down was a Missouri district court case. Despite being an
inferior court in the Eighth Circuit and thus bound by Harmon,the trial judge
in Citizens Legal EnvironmentalAction Network, Inc. v. Premium Standard
Farms, Inc. ("CLEAN") found that a state settlement did not create a res
judicata bar to the bulk of the citizen suit claims under CWA and CAA.78
74

Harmon Indus., Inc., 191 F.3d at 894.

See United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting
that neither party on appeal challenged EPA's right to overfile). The same case would come
back three years later at the summary judgment stage to give the court the chance to
definitively challenge Harmon. See infra Part IV.
76
See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 525-26 (4th Cir. 1999).
" This analysis is based on electronic searches of cases containing some variation of
"overfile" or citing Harmon. Not included are cases that cited Harmon for uncontroversial
outside the realm of EPA overfiling.
propositions
78
Citizens Legal Envtl. ActionNetwork, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., No. 97-6073iS

898

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 28:885

The CLEAN defendant was a massive hog farming operation with nine
hundred thousand hogs at fifteen facilities in northern Missouri.79 A consortium of neighbors sued the farming operation in 1997, alleging violations of
the CWA, CAA, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ° Missouri brought its own claim in
1999 for violations of the state's version of CWA and within six months
reached a settlement with the defendant that purported to release the farm
from any liability for violations the state knew of at the time of the settlement, whether under state or federal law."' The defendant then claimed that
the citizen suit CAA and CWA claims were barred by the res judicata effect
of the settlement.8 2
In analyzing the resjudicata question, the court followed Harmon for the
proposition that the statute at issue could govern whether the parties were
identical, but found that different language in CWA and CAA meant that
under those statutes, identity was only met if the state "' diligently prosecuted'
an action with respect to the same violations."83 Thus, even inside the Eighth
Circuit, Harmon's res judicata holding was quickly limited to RCRA.
The next two cases both came from federal district courts in Ohio, with
one finding Harmon inapplicable to CWA and the next finding the case
inapplicable to CAA. In the former case, the City of Youngstown claimed
that EPA could not pursue CWA violations because the Agency had
delegated that authority to the state, which was also proceeding with a
claim." In a brief opinion denying the city's motion for judgment as a matter
of law, the court found Harmon "inapposite" because of its reliance on
CV-SJ-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1990, at *63-64 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2000) (finding res
judicata bars a citizen suit claim following state settlement only for the specific incidents
common to both proceedings) [hereinafter CLEAN]. Technically, the decision was not an
overfiling case at all, since the state settlement was preceded by a private suit, see id. at *2,
but it represents an early limiting of Harmon and the only consideration of the issue inside
the Eighth Circuit thus far.
Id. at * 1-2. Even the judge seemed astounded at the scale of the farms, noting that state
I'
permits allowed the defendant, Premium Standard Farms, to put "more than 750 million
gallons of animal waste" into the land each year. Id. (emphasis in original).
so Id. at *2.
"' Id. at *2-3.
82 Id. at *3.
83Id. at *39. The court noted that CAA and CWA lacked the "same force and effect" and "in
lieu of' language relied upon by the Harmon courts. Id.
s See United States v. City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 740 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
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RCRA language.85 Indeed, the court found that the "language of CWA, on the
other hand, compels the opposite conclusion." 6
Three months later a second federal Ohio case found Harmon'sanalysis
did not extend to CAA for overfiling or res judicata purposes. The defendant
steel company challenged EPA enforcement based on the company's
settlement with the city of Cleveland, which was exercising authority through
Ohio's State Implementation Plan ("SIP").87 The court first found that the
settlement did not bind the state-which seemingly would have settled the
case--but chose to address the overfiling claim assuming that the settlement
did bind the state.88 Like the Youngstown court, the LTV Steel court found
Harmon "simply not applicable" because of its reliance on specific RCRA
language. 9 The court pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)-which instructs courts
to consider previous payments assessed for the same violation in setting a
penalty-as evidence that Congress actually expected overfiling under CAA,
since otherwise the language would have been unnecessary. 9 After interpreting the statute, the court turned to Chevron for additional support for its
holding, noting that EPA had consistently interpreted CAA to allow overfiling.9 The court also rejected a res judicata defense, finding that neither the
claims nor the parties were the same, and that Harmon had no relevance
because it hinged on RCRA language not present in CAA. 92
The next element of the Harmon quarantine is strikingly similar to
Youngstown. The case involved a city trying to avoid EPA liability based on
a CWA agreement with the state.93 This time, the City of Rock Island, Illinois
5

I1d. at 741.
8 Id. The court cited 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i) (2000), which states that, "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section
1319 of the title." Id.
87
See United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828-30 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
iId. at 832.
19Id. at 833.
9 Id.
91 id. at 834-35. The court's nod to Chevron is somewhat confusing given that it never finds
the statute ambiguous, as Chevron deference requires. See supranote 54 and accompanying
text. The final statement of the holding appears to use Chevron as a policy guideline rather
than binding authority: "The Court concludes, accordingly, that the language of the Act,
federal precedent, deference to the EPA and common sense all lead" to upholding CAA
overfiling. Id. at 835.
9 See id. at 836.
93See United States v. City of Rock Island, 182 F. Supp. 2d 690, 691 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
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was caught discharging untreated sewer water from its treatment plant into
the Mississippi River.94 The court first found that an agreement between the
state and EPA did not bar EPA enforcement. 5 Next, the court looked to
CWA and found no statutory provisions impeding EPA enforcement;96 the
court also noted 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i), as Youngstown had.97 The court then
addressed the defendant's reliance on Harmon in now-familiar terms: "[T]he
decision clearly does not apply here. Harmonrelies heavily upon language in
RCRA which does not appear in the Clean Water Act.!"
The final case in this quintet went beyond merely distinguishing
Harmon as applying only to RCRA to criticize the holding on its merits. EPA
brought a twenty-four-count civil suit, including CAA, CWA, and RCRA
claims, against a petroleum refinery.99 The defendant raised a res judicata
challenge to the CAA claims based on a settlement reached with the state."°°
Responding to an argument raised but not pressed by the defendants, the
court noted that CAA did not have any language prohibiting overfiling and,
like the LTV Steel court, pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) as implicit
recognition that overfiling may occur.' ' The judge then turned to the res
judicata claim and found that the identity of the parties requirement was not
met.0 2 Like her peers, the judge first found that Harmon was "inapplicable
to Clean Air Act enforcement actions. ' '103 Moreover, the judge went on to
question Harmon's application to RCRA:
I am not persuaded by the reasoning of the court of appeals in
[Harmon] that the structure of acts such as the Clean Air Act
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act bring the
94 Id. at 691.

91 Id. at 693.

See id.
9 See id; supra note 86.
9' City ofRock Island, 182 F. Supp 2d at 694. Specifically, the court noted the absence of the
"in lieu of' or "same force and effect" language and the presence of the "Federal enforcement
is not limited" provision in § 1342(i). Id. The court concluded by citing Youngstown to
buttress its point on the statutory language. See id. at 694 (citing United States v. City of
Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 (N.D. Ohio 2000)).
9 United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1062 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
0
/d. at 1087. The court's RCRA analysis will be taken up in Part III.B., infra.
o Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-88.
9

102 See id. at 1092.
103

Id. at 1091.
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federal government and the state into such a close working
relationship as to make them equivalent to the same party for
purposes of res judicata."
In challenging Harmon'sres judicata holding, the court implicitly called its
overfiling holding into question, because the Eighth Circuit's res judicata
decision was predicated on the RCRA language it adduced in its overfiling
analysis.1 °5
The pattern for CWA and CAA cases is clear. In each of the five cases
since Harmon, courts have rejected efforts to extend the case to other statutes,
essentially walling off Harmon in the RCRA portion of the United States
Code.
B.

DistinguishingRCRA Cases Based on Lack of State Enforcement
Action

Three cases have upheld RCRA overfiling by distinguishing the quality
of the state action while at the same time implicitly or explicitly challenging
Harmon's legal conclusions. 0 6 The Harmon decision could be seen as
providing persuasive authority for a broad bar on EPA enforcement in
authorized states-whether the state initiated enforcement action or not-as
defendants have argued. The narrowest reading, however, only bars overfiling if the state has initiated an enforcement action.'0 7 The cases below
embrace the narrowest readings of Harmon, while also implying or declaring
a rejection of its legal conclusions.
The first case, United States v. Flanagan, in which the rejection of
'0 Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999) ("As we
determined in Part II(A) ... the plain language of the RCRA permits the State of Missouri
to act in lieu of the EPA ... Accordingly the two parties stand in the same relationship to one
another.").
"oThis section does not include the district court or appellate court opinions in UnitedStates
v. PowerEngineeringCo., an RCRA case in which the courts made no attempt to distinguish
Harmon. These two opinions will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
'07 The Harmon holding simply barred overfiling. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902. At the
beginning of the opinion, however, the court defined overfiling as EPA's practice "of
duplicating enforcement actions ... ." Id. at 898. Finally, when discussing the legislative
history, the court concluded that Congress intended to allow EPA enforcement only if EPA
withdrew state authorization or "if the state fails to initiate an enforcement action." Id. at 899.
105
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Harmon is disguised by sleight-of-hand, involved defendants moving to
dismiss criminal indictments under RCRA.38 Each of the three defendants
was charged with three counts of treating and storing hazardous waste
without the required permit."9 The court rejected their argument that Harmon
stood for stripping EPA of its enforcement authority in authorized states,
instead reading the case as being "not about if, but about when" EPA can
bring enforcement actions in an authorized state. "0
Because the case involved a challenge to EPA's RCRA authority,
however, the court could not simply distinguish Harmon as inapplicable, as
CWA and CAA courts had done. The court had to conduct its own RCRA
analysis. In doing so, it rejected the defendants' argument--embraced by
Harmon-that the "in lieu of the Federal program" language in § 6926(b)
indicated that state enforcement supplanted EPA authority. " The court found
the term "program" was ambiguous and that the statute as a whole and its
legislative history were inconsistent with reading the clause to prohibit EPA
enforcement." 2 The court gives no hint that Harmon considered the same
issues and reached the opposite conclusion on each point. The Eighth Circuit
found the same language to be unambiguous in favor of barring EPA
enforcement and gleaned a Congressional intent to bar overfiling from the
statute as a whole and legislative history." 3 Thus Flanagan explicitly
distinguishes Harmon on the facts of the case while implicitly challenging
and rejecting the Eighth Circuit's legal analysis.
The second court to consider RCRA overfiling in light of Harmon
showed no such reluctance to explicitly challenge the Eighth Circuit's legal
conclusions. The Murphy Oil case, introduced in Part LI.A., initially distinguished Harmon because it involved a consent decree approved by a state
judge while the instant case involved only a state enforcement action that had
been stayed without ajudgment or settlement.' '4 The court then turned to the
heart of RCRA overfiling. After an extensive review ofHarmon'sreasoning,
8
'o

See United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 2000).

0Id.

"Old. at 1289.

. Id. at 1286. Interestingly, the court does not discuss Harmon in this context and only
mentions the case later in the opinion as a case cited by the defense. See id. at 1289
(mentioning Harmon for the first time).
"

See id. at 1287.

"3
14

See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 901-02 (8th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1114 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
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the court concluded that it was "unpersuasive" and that the decision "rested
on a flawed interpretation of the act and in particular, a mistaken reading of
the 'in lieu of language in § 6926(b).. .." The court challenged the "in lieu
of" interpretation, suggesting that the structure of the clause meant it only
applied to the regulatory program and not enforcement." 6 The court also
found that the Harmon interpretation of "same force and effect" in § 6926(d)
was vitiated by the heading "Effect of State permit," which limited the
language's effect to permits rather than enforcement. " In a concluding
flourish, the judge noted that the Eighth Circuit found the statute unambiguous before adding,
I agree with the conclusion that the act is unambiguous.
However, my reading of the act is that it authorizes the federal
government to bring enforcement actions in states authorized
to implement and enforce the hazardous waste program,
provided only that notice is given to the state. "
That reading made resort to legislative history unnecessary, the court
found." 9 If legislative history review was necessary, the court found nothing
suggested a Congressional intent to bar overfiling and that deference to
EPA's interpretation would be warranted under Chevron. 20 The court thus
read the statute and the legislative history to the exact opposite effect of the
Eighth Circuit.
The final installment in this trilogy, UnitedStates v. Elias,represents the
first time a sister circuit addressed overfiling post-Harmon.The case reached
the Ninth Circuit as an appeal from an RCRA conviction for ordering
2
employees to dispose of hazardous chemicals without proper protection.1 '
"'5

Id. at 1116. The court cited the Power Engineeringdistrict court opinion for support. See
id. (citing United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (D. Colo. 2000)).
116 See Murphy Oil, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
7
11 id.
118 Id. at 1117.
1 9 See id.
20
1
Id.
121United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2001). The facts of the case are
appalling. The defendant wanted to get one to two tons of cyanide-laced sludge out of the
bottom of a storage tank and ordered four employees to do it. Despite the requests of one
employee, he refused to provide any safety equipment. On the second day one of the workers
collapsed and came close to dying. The defendant denied to a treating physician that there
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The defendant argued that EPA could not charge RCRA violations because
the state program supplanted EPA enforcement.' The Ninth Circuit began
its consideration of Harmon by citing Flanagan'sconclusion that the case
was "not about if, but about when" EPA can bring enforcement actions.'23
The court went on to say that Harmon did not support the defendant's claim
that state law in authorized states supplants federal law.'24 The defendant read
Harmonbetter than the Ninth Circuit, however. The Eighth Circuit found that
the "in lieu of' language "reveals a congressional intent for an authorized
state program to supplant the federal hazardous waste program in all respects
including enforcement."' 25 Thus, Elias chipped away at Harmon while
purporting to merely read it fairly and concluded that RCRA only supplants
the permitting, not enforcement, authority of EPA in authorized states. 26 In
addition to that disguised attack on Harmon, the court included a caustic
footnote stating that the case "is also suspect for its marked lack of Chevron
'
deference."127
Perhaps because the RCRA cases brought courts closer to the heart of
Harmon, these three cases all combined distinguishing the facts of the case
with implicit or explicit challenges to the Eighth Circuit's legal analysis.
Those feints foreshadowed the direct assault that came in PowerEngineering.
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT COMPLETES THE QUARANTINE
Where the Ninth Circuit had been circumspect in its challenge in Elias,
the Tenth Circuit made its rejection of Harmon unmistakable in deciding
United States v. Power EngineeringCo.12' The court engaged in a point-bypoint rebuttal of the Eight Circuit, and the resulting opinion reads more like
was cyanide in the tanks; luckily, the man was treated for cyanide poisoning anyway and
recovered. A few weeks later, the defendant ordered a new employee to remove the same
again without safety equipment. Id.
sludge,
22

Id. at 1009. No state enforcement action was brought. See id. at 1008 (defendant moved
to dismiss the federal indictment based on claim that United States ceded criminal
1

enforcement authority to Idaho).

Id. at 1011 (citing United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal.
2000)).
124 Elias, 269 F.3d at 1011.
123 Harmon Indus. Inc., v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999).
126 See Elias, 269 F.3d at 1012.
127 Id. at 1011 n.25.
123

128 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
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an overrule of that court than an affirmation of the trial court decision
actually under consideration.
A.

The Power EngineeringFacts

Power Engineering Company ("PEC") was a Denver-based business
specializing in metal refinishing and chrome electroplating that had been
operating since 1968.29 Every month PEC produced more than one thousand
kilograms of RCRA hazardous waste, including arsenic, lead, mercury, and
hexavalent chromium. 30 State environmental authorities eventually discovered hexavalent chromium contaminating the Platte River and local
groundwater and traced the chemical to PEC.'31 The state also discovered that
PEC had "been treat[ing], stor[ing], and dispos[ing] of hazardous waste
without a permit."'' 32 The state issued an order for PEC to comply with the
law, clean up contaminated soil, "conduct frequent inspections, and submit
...reports."' 33 PEC failed to comply and the state assessed $1.13 million in
civil penalties, which were upheld by a state court when PEC refused to
pay. 134
Meanwhile, EPA asked the state to apply RCRA financial assurance
requirements, and notified state officials that it would bring its own
enforcement action if the state failed to enforce the requirements. 135 The state
36
declined to demand financial assurance and EPA brought a federal suit.'
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with PEC arguing,
based on Harmon, both that RCRA prohibits overfiling and that res judicata
37
barred the EPA claim.
B.

The Trial Court Rejects Harmon Outright

The cross-motions for summary judgment presented the first chance for
a federal court to review Harmon on the merits, without any opportunity to
129

Id. at 1235.

130

United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1052 (D. Colo. 2000).
Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1235.

'3,

32

id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

3
136

137

Id. at 1235-36.
Id. at 1236.
Power Eng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
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simply distinguish the facts of the case. The trial judge first reviewed the
Harmon facts and decision. The court noted that PEC relied on the
"expansive holding" of the case, that EPA was barred from acting when a
state takes any enforcement action. 3 ' Because that holding was broad enough
to cover the facts of the PEC proceeding, the judge found
himself forced to
39
merits.1
the
on
interpretation
RCRA
Harmon's
address
The court first addressed the Harmon RCRA statutory analysis and
found that it "incorrectly interprets RCRA."' 40 The court questioned the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that "administration and enforcement.., are
inexorably intertwined."'' Instead, the trial judge found that the RCRA
structure indicated the opposite by devoting § 6926 to state administration
and enforcement of state regulations while addressing § 6928 to "federal
enforcement of such regulations."' 42 The court also found that the structure
of the § 6926(b) "in lieu of" clause suggested that it applied only to administration and not enforcement. 4 3 Furthermore, thejudge concluded that reading
the sentence as proposed by Harmon would make the enforcement clause
"superfluous," since it would not be necessary to grant enforcement powers
to the states if the first half of the clause already granted authorized states
administration and enforcement power.'"
The court then found that without the presumed meaning of § 6926(b)
requiring states to supplant federal administration and enforcement, several
other of Harmon's textual arguments toppled. 45 The judge went on to
challenge Harmon'sunderstanding of Congressional intent, pointing to both
contrary legislative history and the fact that the citizen suit provision, § 6972,
indicated that "Congress knew how to specifically prohibit enforcement
action once any action is undertaken by a state.' 4 6 The court concluded by
13s

Id. at 1057.

139 See id.
140
'4'
142

Id. at 1059.
Id. (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999)).
PowerEng'g, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.

143 See id.
144 Id.
14-

See id. at 1059-60.

'"Id.at 1061-64. The citizen suit provision barred such claims "if the Administrator or State
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States or a State to require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order." Id. at 1064 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972

(b)(1)(B) (2000)).
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spinning a hypothetical in which a state with a good enforcement record
chose not to prosecute a company on the state border that provided significant
jobs and tax revenue to the regulating state and whose pollution was shared
among the bordering states. '47The court found that Harmonwould force EPA
to do nothing or withdraw authorization from the state-despite its previously
stellar record of RCRA enforcement-and that there was "no evidence that
Congress intended such an outcome."' 4 The court also rejected the res
judicata claim, calling that ground ofHarmon an "unsupported expansion of
the doctrine ofres judicata as... applied to the federal government ....
Thus the trial court rebuked the Eighth Circuit on virtually every point
of its opinion and allowed EPA's claim to proceed. PEC appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, setting the stage for the most dramatic overfiling case since
Harmon.
C.

The Tenth Circuit Completes the Quarantine

Ironically, the Tenth Circuit began its analysis-as the Eighth Circuit
had-by outlining its responsibilities under Chevron."' Where Harmon
found RCRA unambiguously barred overfiling and Murphy Oil found the
statute unambiguously allowed overfiling, the Tenth Circuit found the statute
to be ambiguous on the issue and that EPA's interpretation was reasonable.'
In finding the statute ambiguous, the court rejected a number of
Harmon'sinterpretations. The court first criticized Harmon'sreliance on the
§ 6926(b) "in lieu of' language.' The Tenth Circuit noted its sister circuit's
concession that the clause referred only to the regulatory program and not
enforcement, but that the Eighth went on to conclude that the two were
"inexorably intertwined. '' 13 The PowerEngineeringcourt found that Harmon
failed to account for the separation of the clauses in § 6926(b) and for the
presence of separate sections detailing federal enforcement and state administration and enforcement. 5 4 The court concluded that EPA was not unreason147 See Power Eng'g,
141 id. at 1065.

125 F. Supp. 2d. at 1064-65.

49
1 Id.

at 1065; see also id. at 1066-67 (expanding its analysis).
United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2002).

's
'
'Id.

Id. at 1240.
at 1237-38.

SId.
1

at 1238 (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999)).

PowerEng'g, 303 F.3d at 1238 (pointing to §§ 6928 and 6926, respectively).
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able in concluding that administration and enforcement were "not inexorably
intertwined.""'
Next, the court questioned Harmon's effort to "harmoniz[e]" the
statutory language allowing EPA enforcement in certain circumstances with
the provision allowing EPA to withdraw state authorization."6 Harmon
concluded that reading the two together meant Congress only intended to
allow EPA enforcement if authorization was rescinded or if the state failed
to initiate enforcement."5 7 The Tenth Circuit found the harmonization went
"well beyond the plain language of the statute," adding that the only statutory
requirement for EPA to bring an enforcement action was that it provide
notice to the state.158
The court also challenged the Eighth Circuit's reading of the "same
force and effect" language from § 6926(d). Reading the provision in the
context of the statute as a whole, the court found that § 6926 addressed state
program authorization, "not federal enforcement."'5 9 The court added that the
heading of § 6926(d) "Effect of a State permit" indicated that the language
meant only that "state permits [had] the 'same force and effect' as federal
permits."'" Thus, the Tenth Circuit rejected Harmon's conclusion that
limiting the provision to the issuance of permits "was 'incongruous' with
RCRA as a whole."''
Concluding its overfiling analysis, the court found that both EPA and
PEC could amass statutory language to support their arguments, and thus that
Congress had not spoken to the issue, making Chevron deference to EPA's
reasonable interpretation appropriate. 2

155 Id.

" Id. (noting that § 6298(a)(1)-(2) outlines when EPA can bring enforcement actions, while
§ 6296(b) concerns withdrawing state authorization).
' Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899.
151 PowerEng'g, 303 F.3d at 1238.

In the case of a violation of any requirement of this subchapter... in a State
which is authorized to carry out a hazardous waste program under [§ 6926], the
Administrator shall give notice to the State in which such violation has occurred
prior to issuing an order or commencing a civil action under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2)(2000).
PowerEng'g, 303 F.3d at 1239.
160 Id.

1.Id. (quoting Harmon, 191 F.3d at
62 PowerEng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240.

900).

2004]

PERFECT HARMONY

909

The court then rejected the res judicata defense for lack of privity
between EPA and the state. 63 The decision was based on the finding that
"states act in lieu of the EPA only" in administration and issuing permits,
rather than in enforcement.'" The res judicata analysis completed the Tenth
Circuit's systematic rejection of virtually every point ofthe Harmon decision.
While affirming the trial court in a case that had only a statute in
common with Harmon, the Tenth Circuit wrote an opinion that read like an
overrule of the Eighth. In 1999, the Eighth Circuit took eleven pages of the
FederalReporter to upset the legal convention on overfiling. Three years
later, the Tenth Circuit needed just nine pages to complete the Harmon
quarantine, ruling that its sister circuit was simply wrong in reading RCRA
to find an unambiguous statutory bar to overfiling.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HARMON QUARANTINE

In the fiscal years 1994 and 1995, EPA brought overfiling enforcement
actions in a total of eighteen cases, about 0.1 percent of all state enforcement
proceedings. 65 In 1997, the total was four cases.' Based on those totals, the
battle for EPA overfiling authority could be seen as a waste of time and
resources. In reality, however, the overfiling power may be the fulcrum of
environmental enforcement. States conduct about ninety percent of all
inspections and eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement
actions. 67 EPA certainly does not have the staff, the budget, or the desire to
take on that responsibility. 6" The Agency has only two tools to ensure that
states diligently enforce RCRA, CWA, and CAA: 1) withdrawing state
authorization, and 2) overfiling in individual cases. 69 The former would be
63

at 1241.
Id.
165Coop, supra note 33, at 257 n.23.
'
1I4

Id.

166Id.

A. Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement. A Comment on a Recent
DiscussionattheAALS,[2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,639, 10,640 (Aug. 2000)
(quoting Professor Clifford Rechtschaffen).
'" Cf Mintz, supra note 6, at 426 (federalizing enforcement injust one state would "place
an enormous slain upon the EPA's highly limited enforcement resources").
69
A recent decision by the Supreme Court confirns a third tool, though the language of the
decision limits its use to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program ("PSD") under
CAA. This third tool allows EPA to review the substance of PSD permits and overrule those
it determines are unreasonable. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot.
167 Joel
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prohibitively expensive for EPA and is not seen as a serious threat. 7 ° Thus
overfiling-and, more commonly, the prospect of overfiling-is the only
federal leverage that prevents states from entering into "sweetheart deals"
with polluters."' Overfiling also addresses problems stemming from interstate pollution and the "race-to-the-bottom" by giving EPA a way to ensure
minimum enforcement standards are met.172 If RCRA, CWA, and CAA are
the holy trinity of American environmental law,173 overfiling is the mundane
tool that ensures their continued relevance.
Based on that understanding, Harmon was rightly seen as a dire threat
to overfiling, and, by extension, to the nation's most important environmental
laws. Ironically, EPA's overfiling power in some ways appears stronger today
than it did pre-Harmon. Before the case, overfiling was a little-used trick up
EPA's sleeve-one that was believed to be legal but that had not been
rigorously tested. The Harmon decision appeared to provide defendants with
an additional shield to fend off EPA enforcement at the same time EPA had
decided for tactical reasons to increase its overfiling efforts. Harmon also
provided a common name and template for a type of challenge that had long
existed without a settled rhetoric. Before 1999, overfiling challenges were
scattered and inconsistent, which explains why the Harmon courts thought
it was a matter of first impression: the lack of common language prevented
an easy catalog of previous cases. The Eighth Circuit immediately changed
that, and all of the post-Harmon defendants relied on the case and its language. Some defendants apparently did little else and were content to use the
decision like a talisman to ward off overfiling. 74
Agency, No 02-658, slip op. at 36 (Jan. 21, 2004). The Court upheld EPA's authority to halt
construction upon finding that a delegated state's determination of Best Available Control
Technology-a statutory requirement for PSD permits--was unreasonable. See id. In one
sense, this authority could be considered pre-overfiling, since it has a similar effect of
overturning state action, but comes at the permitting stage rather than after permit violation.
"' Organ, supra note 8, at 10,616 (noting that EPA has never withdrawn state program
approval and that the prospect is considered "an empty threat").
"' Mintz, supra note 6, at 450.
172 Coop, supra note 33, at 267-68.
173 Cf Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's EnvironmentalAboutEnvironmentalLaw in the
Supreme Court,47 UCLA L. REV. 703,704 (2000) (calling the passage of the three landmark
environmental laws "one ofthe most ambitious legislative and executive branch undertakings
of the past half-century").
74 Several of the post-Harmon overfiling defendants appear to have relied exclusively on that
decision to challenge EPA enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. City of Youngstown, 109
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The combination of EPA bringing more overfiling cases at the same
time a court provided a common vernacular for defendants created a flurry of
Harmon challenges against EPA enforcement, which federal courts universally struck down. Thus while Harmon remains the law for RCRA in the
Eighth Circuit, the new weight of federal authority clearly allows overfiling
in CAA and CWA cases, while favoring overfiling in RCRA cases as well.
Harmon and the cases quarantining it replaced a system of uniform
uncertainty with a binary system of relative certainty in which the results
differ depending on geography. At least for now, the statutory bar on RCRA
overfiling has been quarantined in the strip of heartland states that comprise
the Eighth Circuit: Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and South Dakota.
The quarantine, while salutary, does not ensure the health of the rest of
the nation, however. The overfiling schism presents a stronger than usual case
for Supreme Court review-though the Court apparently disagreed 75
because the circuit split at issue means that a federal law designed to ensure
uniform protection against the adverse health impacts of solid and hazardous
waste is applied differently in different states. The problem can be seen at its
starkest in a place like Kansas City, where a single metropolitan area spans
two states (Kansas and Missouri) that happen to be in the opposing circuits.
Revisiting the hypothetical spun by the PowerEngineeringtrial court, 176 one
could imagine a major plant in the Kansas City area sitting near the
Kansas/Missouri border. If we imagine that the plant's state would choose a
sweetheart settlement without the threat of overfiling-in order to keep on
good terms with the company and maximize tax revenue and jobs--only the
potential for EPA action would serve to ensure RCRA compliance. With the
circuit split as it stands now, the polluting plant could be untouchable if it
happened to be located on the Missouri side of the metropolitan area and thus
within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit, but subject to EPA overfiling
enforcement if on the Kansas side.
In some ways this is a simple externalization problem, but it is
particularly galling and ironic because it is caused not by local law but by
F. Supp. 2d 739, 740 (N.D. Ohio 2000) ("Youngstown places exclusive reliance on
Harmon");see also United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002)
("PEC contends that the district court erred in not following the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation"); United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Elias cites the
Eighth Circuit's decision").
'"See supranote 6.
176See 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1064-65 (D. Colo. 2000).
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differing regional interpretations of a federal law designed to eliminate such
problems. To the extent that polluters operate on the circuit dividing line,
Eighth Circuit states will get more environmental protection than they pay for
while the Tenth Circuit states get less. Eighth Circuit residents and businesses
will enjoy some spillover benefits from the Tenth Circuit and will pay less to
comply with RCRA themselves, because they will not face th eprospect of
more stringent federal enforcement. Meanwhile, states in the Tenth Circuit
will get reduced benefits, because of spillover pollution from the Eighth
Circuit, while paying increased costs to meet more robust federal compliance
requirements.'77
Both the new weight of precedent that has developed since Harmonand
a fair reading of RCRA compel the same solution to the problem: a determination that RCRA is, at best, ambiguous on EPA overfiling and thus that
EPA can reasonably decide either that the statute does or does not allow the
practice. 7 That solution can be reached in one of three ways: through
Supreme Court intervention, amendment ofRCRA, 7 9 or the Eighth Circuit's
reconsideration of Harmon. None of these solutions seems likely, however,
which leaves the Harmon quarantine created by the federal courts and anchored by the Tenth Circuit as the imperfect but vital response to a mistaken
decision.

' This assumes that states and facilities will be more interested in economic than
environmental impacts. While not always true, this assumption prevails often enough and
explains why EPA enforcement is sometimes necessary.
178 EPA can even change its mind over time, presumably based on the changes in
administration. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984) (fimding that the fact that EPA "changed its interpretation" of stationary source under
the CAA did not mean "that no deference should be accorded to the agency's interpretation
of the statute").
79
See Mintz, supranote 6, at 452-53 (advocating a Congressional amendment to RCRA to
clarify EPA overfiling authority).

